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Abstract
Osaka is a typical example of the gentrification of an old factory district in Japan. After an 
economic boom in the early postwar period during which Osaka was the most industrialized 
area in the country, its economy is adjusting to a post-industrialized landscape. Many economic 
and social indicators confirm Osaka’s space and potential for more growth relative to Japan’s 
46 other prefectures. Osaka citizens and businesses want to adapt faster to the post-industrial 
economy. Of course, in every challenge, there are opportunities and some see sparkling gains in 
revitalizing Osaka businesses socioeconomically. Some of the reforms are suggested by outsiders 
and controversial figures. It may be interesting to look at such initiatives (including failed ones) 
emanated from the political fringes from the non-mainstream of local governance, in addition to 
understanding the important developments of the political mainstream.
From the political periphery, Toru Hashimoto emerged in this context as a self-branded 
reformer. As the governor of Osaka Prefecture ( January 2008 to November 20) and the mayor 
of Osaka City (November 20 to November 205), he initiated various local governance reforms 
such as fiscal reconstruction, discipline for public workers, and tackling corruption. As part of the 
reforms, Hashimoto advocated a plan to introduce a new local governance system in Osaka, called 
the Osaka Metropolis Plan. After failing to implement the plan, Hashimoto retired from the political 
world in November 205. 
The Initiative from Osaka (IFO), a local party established by Hashimoto in April 200, inherited 
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Hashimoto’s initiative. Now, the Initiative from Osaka holds a majority of local government 
positions in Osaka and is attempting to complete Hashimoto’s reform plans. The paper is not 
interested in evaluating the performance or outcome of the inherited initiative but examines the 
systemic processes in which reform impulses emerged from the political non-mainstream. While 
it is too early to speculate on the results and not the concern/focus of the paper, it may be useful 
to study Osaka’s push toward business revitalization as Japan’s first case of business/economic/
socioeconomic reforms under an initiative proposed and implemented by non-mainstream 
local politicians. It is may be a useful case study of central-local government relations from the 
perspective of non-mainstream political governance.
Key Words: Japan, Osaka, governance, business, revitalization, post-industrial
1. Introduction
In the early post-WWII period, Osaka flourished as the wealthiest and most industrialized area 
in Japan. Many of Japan’s top manufacturing companies, such as Daikin, Panasonic, and Sharp, 
began in Osaka, and the region took pride as the center of the Japanese economy. Over these 
four decades, Osaka has gradually transited to a post-industrial landscape. Today, Osaka’s income 
level, social indicators, and welfare recipients per capita, show that there is space for improvement 
Osaka relative to Japan’s 46 prefectures. This scenario probed Osaka businesses and citizens to 
strive harder for improvements and upgrades. Under such circumstances, Toru Hashimoto, a 
controversial (differing perceptions according to his supporters and detractors, critics and fans) TV 
personality, emerged from the political periphery in 2003. 
Before entering politics, he was only a TV commentator, known for his straightforward and 
sometimes abrasive points of view. However, after winning the Osaka gubernatorial election in 
January 2008, Hashimoto momentarily became a public figure in the political world. It is a useful 
case study of the iron triangle of local governance, local politics and local businesses. His Osaka 
reform initiative attracted the public’s attention nationwide because it included revision of Japan’s 
conventional local governance system. To proceed with his reform plans, he formed a local political 
party, called the Initiative from Osaka (IFO), in April 200. 
When Hashimoto retired from the political world in 205, the IFO inherited his initiatives 
and has since continued to introduce various reform plans aimed at revitalizing Osaka. Some of 
its plans have been implemented, while others are still pending. This article aims to adduce the 
reasons for Osaka’s state of performance and review the socioeconomic and business challenges 
that Hashimoto and the IFO faced in revitalizing Osaka. It is a study prompted by peering into the 
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centripetal forces of local governance and business from a peripheral lens. It looks at the business 
governance system not from a dominant party’s point of view, or centralized perspective looking 
outwards, but from the local governance point of view and from a less institutionalized, peripheral, 
and maybe even marginalized perspective. 
It does not detract from the need to study dominant and ruling party systems or central 
governance or the perspective from the bureaucratic/political center peering outwards but wants 
to contribute to existing literatures by looking at the lens from the other way round (i.e. externally 
peering inwards into the political mainstream and center). Neither does the paper intend to critique 
domestic and local politics, it is only interested in the process and issues of reforms but not the 
political factionalism involved. The authors maintain political neutrality in examining this case study 
and are not interested in political judgements and evaluations. 
Instead, its focus is on the idea and concept of business reforms launched at the local level and 
understand systemically how local governance entities try to introduce economic reforms to change 
the status quo and understand business governance system from its periphery and marginality. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines Japan’s local governance system, 
while Section 3 summarizes Osaka’s economic history. Sections 4 and 5 review two of the major 
administrative issues in Osaka. Section 6 details Hashimoto’s and the IFO’s activities. Finally, 
Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
2. Japan’s local governance system
(1) Two layers of local government
Before discussing details of the Osaka Problem, it is useful to provide an overview of the 
relationship between Japan’s national and local governments. Because Tokyo’s local governance 
system is unique from that of other areas, this paper will review the local governance system for 
non-Tokyo areas first. There are two layers of local government in Japan. The administrative system 
of the first layer is known as the “municipality,” which is the most basic unit of local governance. 
There are three categories in a municipality: city (over 50,000 people), town (between 8,000 and 
50,000 people), and village ( fewer than 8,000 people)). If a city’s population exceeds 500,000, and 
the Prime Minister’s Office recognizes the city government as having a high level of administrative 
ability, the city qualifies to become an “ordinance-designated city” (to clarify, this paper uses the 
term “ordinary” to refer to a city that is not an ordinance-designated city). 
The administrative unit of the second administrative layer is called a “prefecture.” The 
prefectural government supports the municipal governmental units within its jurisdiction by 
providing public services that require special knowledge, additional resources, and/or that cover a 
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broader scope than a municipality. An ordinance-designated city government has an advantage of 
possessing far greater administrative power than an ordinary city government. For example, the 
municipal governments in ordinance-designated cities have the power to appoint teaching staff in 
prefectural schools in their jurisdictions.
The public welfare program is a good example of the division of roles between the national, 
prefectural, and municipal governments. The National Diet is in charge of establishing a general 
framework for the welfare program. The National Diet frames the Public Assistance Act, which 
stipulates that a person who is unable to maintain a minimum standard of living due to poverty 
should receive welfare assistance. In villages and towns, the prefectural government designates 
who is qualified to receive public support and provides welfare funding from its own budget. The 
municipal governments in villages and towns are responsible only for straightforward services 
such as receiving welfare funding from the prefectural government and providing that money to the 
recipients. 
In both ordinance-designated and ordinary cities, the municipal governments designate who is 
qualified to receive public support and share the financial burden of supplying welfare funding with 
the prefectural government. The prefectural government supports the municipal governments in 
cities by appointing designated medical institutions, which receive subsidies from the prefectural 
government to provide medical treatment for needy individuals. The municipal governments 
in ordinance-designated cities are also allowed (but not obliged) to appoint designated medical 
institutions. The prefectural and municipal governments share revenue from local taxes. As the 
roles of the municipal government increase according to the category of municipality, the portion of 
local tax revenue that corresponds to the municipal government also increases. 
Each municipal or prefectural government has its own person in charge and assembly. 
The heads of municipal and prefectural governments are called the “mayor” and “governor,” 
respectively. Residents older than 8 years are allowed to vote in the elections for the mayor, 
governor, and members of the municipal and prefectural assemblies. As population increases, 
effective communication between the municipal government and citizens becomes more difficult. 
To overcome this, ordinance-designated cities have a unique administrative system called the “ward” 
system. The area of an ordinance-designated city is divided into wards, each with its own office, which 
provides basic services (e.g., registrations of a birth, a death, a divorce, and a marriage) to the ward’s 
residents. However, the basic unit of local governance is not a ward but an ordinance-designated city 
since the head of each ward is appointed by the mayor, not chosen by election. This is because the 
head of a ward is responsible only for administrative matters and not for making political decisions.
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(2) Tokyo’s unique local governance system
Similar to Japan’s 46 prefectures, Tokyo’s local governance system also comprises two layers 
of administration. However, the upper layer is called a “metropolis” instead of a “prefecture”; thus, 
the prefecture government’s official name is the “ Tokyo Metropolitan Government.” The Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government has its own assembly, whose leader is called the “governor.” Residents 
older than 8 years are allowed to vote in the elections for governor and the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Assembly. As for the lower layer of administration, there are eight villages, five towns, and 26 
cities (all of which are ordinary cities) in the Tokyo Metropolis, which also includes another type 
of municipality unit (i.e., in the lower layer of administration) called the “special ward.” There 
are 23 special wards in Tokyo. Unlike wards in ordinance-designated cities, each special ward is 
recognized as the basic unit of local governance. Each special ward has its own assembly, with a 
head known as the “mayor.” Residents older than 8 years can vote in the elections for the mayor 
and assembly members.
The administrative activities/powers of a special ward’s government are limited compared to 
the other municipality types (i.e., village, town, and city). The Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
carries out some of the special ward’s activities/powers that are often conducted by municipal 
governments in other municipality types. For example, while municipal governments in cities 
are authorized to design land development plans in their jurisdictions, the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government does this instead of the 23 special ward governments. The taxation powers of special 
ward governments are also limited. The imposing and collection of asset taxes in the 23 special 
wards is within the purview of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, but this activity is done by the 
municipal governments in the other prefectures.
The special ward system is unique in the sense that the administrative power of the basic unit 
of local governance is mitigated. In fact, the prototype of the special ward system was established 
in 947, in the midst of WWII. To implement and operate the defense system for the Imperial 
headquarters quickly, the national government wanted to fast-track and accelerate/omit the process 
of negotiation with local governments in Tokyo. The democratization of local governance after 
WWII co-exists with the idiosyncratic features of the special ward governments’ administrative 
power. A graphical depiction of Japan’s local governance system is presented in Figure . As can be 
seen in the figure, the ordinance-designated city government is qualified to perform more functions 
than any other type of municipal government. Figure  also shows that the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government has power over the special ward governments because their budgets and activities 
depend on the Tokyo Metropolitan Government.
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3. Osaka’s economic history
(1) Osaka’s high performance in the early postwar period
Osaka has a glorious history of leading the Japanese economy. When Japan entered a heavy 
industrialization stage in the 920s, Osaka became the mecca of modern factories. Further, in the 
920s, Osaka was the sixth largest city in the world ( larger than Tokyo) and called “Great Osaka.” 
Osaka attracted manufacturers for the following four reasons. First, it has one of Japan’s top-class 
ports, Osaka Port. Second, because Osaka is at the estuary of the Yodo River, which is one of 
Japan’s largest rivers, it has an accessible fresh water supply 2). Third, since Osaka is a gateway to 
Kyoto, which had been Japan’s capital for more than 000 years until the Meiji Restoration of 868, 
very rich merchants, who started new factories, lived in Osaka. Fourth, Osaka has easy access to 
low-wage manual workers because of its long history of fostering communities of migrant workers 
from less developed areas in Japan.
Osaka’s resources/supplies were significantly altered when Japan introduced a rationing 
system for industrial materials and fuel in 938 as part of the country’s state mobilization of 
resources. For more efficient manufacturing of strategic resources, the national government moved 














Figure 1. The structure of local governance
Note: A ward is a part of the ordinac-designated city government, and 
budgets and activities of special wards are dependent on the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government. Dot lines (instead of rigid lines) show 
dependence  of wards and special wards to the upper local bodies.
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Allied Forces damaged Osaka’s industrial capabilities. In the 950s, when Japan restarted heavy 
industrialization, economic vitality returned to Osaka. During Japan’s high growth era (from around 
950 to the mid-970s), Osaka’s economy grew faster than Tokyo’s 3).
(2) The Nixon shock as the turning point
In 97, US President Richard Nixon surprised the international community with two shocking 
announcements. One was his intention to visit Beijing for discussions aimed at reaching a Sino-
American rapprochement (announced on July 5, 97). The other was the suspension of the 
existing Bretton Woods system of international financial exchange (announced on August 5, 
97). These two events, known as the ‘Nixon Shocks’, greatly impacted the Japanese economy 
and, in particular, Osaka’s economy. Under the Bretton Woods Agreement, the yen-dollar exchange 
rate was fixed at  dollar = 360 yen; this meant the yen was undervalued in terms of its market 
rate and therefore favored Japanese manufacturers’ exports. After the suspension of the Bretton 
Woods system, the yen exchange rate increased sharply, and thus the international competitive 
power of Japanese manufacturers adjusted accordingly. In addition, the improvement of China-US 
relationships helped China promote its industrialization by importing technologies from developed 
countries, including Japan. Starting in the late 970s, Japanese manufacturers, such as Panasonic, 
moved their factories to China (and later to countries part of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations), looking for cheaper labor and looser environmental regulations. 
The Nixon Shocks can be seen as the turning point for the Japanese economy’s shift from 
industrialization to post-industrialization. This was an economic/industrial adjustment transition for 
Osaka, whose economic growth largely relied on the manufacturing sector. As factories in Osaka 
accommodated international competitive power, Osaka tried to locate new leading businesses 
to take the place of flagship industries. As a result, as can be seen in Table , in the period of 
adjustment, Osaka’s percentage in Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) continually trended 
downwards over four decades. As shown in Figure 2, Osaka’s per-capita income, which had been 
the highest among the 46 prefectures until 983, is trending south of the national average 4).
4. Local governance in Osaka
Osaka’s history of fostering low-wage laborers has created a unique local political dynamic. 
Before postwar democracy was adopted, laborers’ human rights were not complementary with 
contemporary understanding. After postwar democratization, they formed common-interest 
groups and started petitioning for special support from local governments. A common-interest 














Figure 2. Comparison of per-capita income














Table 1. Osaka’s share in Japan’s GDP
(%)
Year 2011 2005 1995 1990 1980









Note: Year = Japanese fiscal year (from April 1 in the calendar year to March 31 in the next 
calendar year).
Source: Report on Prefectural Accounts produced by the Cabinet Office.
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minority groups. The political influence of these groups became pronounced as a result of postwar 
democratization. Democratically, some local politicians accommodated their demands during 
election campaigns and in implementing local policies. To complement the advocacies of interest 
groups, various systems were created5).
In the process of co-option and integration, local politicians may arrange local government 
public service positions for some influential representatives of common-interest groups. They 
were leaders in labor unions of public servants and support the politicians during their election 
campaigns. There is an iron triangle of tripar tite arrangements between local politicians, 
representatives of advocacy groups and civil service. Subsidy allocation was arranged by public 
servants, common-interest groups and politicians within the tripartite arrangement. In this way, 
even small but politically integrated groups often play critical roles in economic and business 
governance. 
Because Osaka’s booming economy brought in rising tax revenues to local governments until 
the early 970s, the local governments were wealthy enough to foster this tripartite arrangement 
between local politicians, labor unions of public servants, and common-interest groups. The 
tripartite arrangement became conventional and endured with the rise and ebb of tax revenues. In 
years that were lean, local governments in Osaka managed personnel expenses carefully in view 
of working morale among public servants and other stakeholders. Aligned against supporters of 
this harmonious tripartite arrangements, some critics and critiques did not like tripartitism when it 
came to public construction projects, management of public funds. Others saw a way to work with 
the system and not overhaul it.
5. Coordination between Osaka’s city and prefectural governments
Osaka Prefecture is the second smallest prefecture in terms of acreage among the 46 
prefectures 6). It consists of one village, nine towns, and 33 cities. Osaka City, which was designated 
as one of the first ordinance-designated cities along with four other major cities (namely, Nagoya, 
Kyoto, Kobe, and Yokohama) in 95, contributes 60% of Osaka Prefecture’s GDP. Based on its 
strong administrative power as an ordinance-designated city, Osaka’s city government designs 
various policies for their own accounts. 
Simultaneously, a large portion of Osaka’s prefectural government’s policies also focus on 
activities in Osaka City, which shares a dominant position in the economy of Osaka Prefecture. The 
system to coordinate policies between Osaka’s city and prefectural governments have not been 
formalized. Some find the ambiguity helpful and strategic in managing jurisdictional boundaries. 
For example, the two governments both invest in public facilities such as libraries, museums, 
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schools, sport facilities, and the water supply system. Others prefer a clear-cut distinction in 
jurisdiction. They want better coordination in land use planning with neighboring cities, enhancing 
efficiency.
6. Osaka’s reform plan initiatives
(1) Toru Hashimoto’s political debut
A cyclical economic downturn and boosting local government efficiency have resulted in 
potential areas for upgrading Osaka’s performance in terms of its social indicators 7). For example, 
the number of people living below the poverty line and crimes per person in Osaka can improve 
among the 46 prefectures, while students’ academic scores in compulsory education areas for 
further enhancements. Osaka’s challenges and opportunities augmented expectations for a new 
leader who would revitalize its society grew. Out of these conditions, Toru Hashimoto emerged as 
an entity in Osaka’s political world. He was not yet in the public eye until the age of 33; however, 
once he appeared as a notable lawyer on an Osaka-based television program in 2003, his persona 
and frank discussion style attracted an audience. Quickly, he became one of the most visible TV 
personalities in Osaka. He ran in Osaka Prefecture’s gubernatorial election in January 2008. Despite 
his political inexperience and lack of support from influential groups, Hashimoto enjoyed an 
overwhelming victory.
Hashimoto worked on his reform programs as soon as he took office. He actively launched a 
series of administrative system reforms in Osaka’s prefectural government. For example, under 
Hashimoto’s leadership, management of the two international airports in Osaka Prefecture, 
namely, Osaka International Airport and Kansai International Airport, was unified and privatized. 
Hashimoto urged the national government to reduce the local governments’ share (and increase 
the national government’s share) of expenses related to public construction projects in Osaka 
Prefecture. Hashimoto also initiated the financial reconstruction of Osaka’s prefectural government 
by revising its management system for public-sector accounting, cutting public servants’ wages, and 
withdrawing from business ventures jointly financed by the prefectural government and the private 
sector. He tackled conflicts of interest in all sectors and was unconventional in governance methods. 
Unlike the majority of politicians in Osaka, Hashimoto relied on TV audiences’ support and, 
therefore, did not depend on Osaka’s established political dynamics. Thus, he worked with the mass 
media on awareness of prominent issues and tried to implement prevention systems. Hashimoto 
wanted more accountability for subsidies in the public sector and sought like-minded allies in the 
political realm. His policies appeared to motivate fiscal discipline among public servants. These 
reforms drew both appreciation and critiques. Critiques came from some local politicians and labor 
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unions of public servants in Osaka Prefecture. But these critics themselves also received critiques 
from others who are keen to have changes. This is a normal consequence of a functioning liberal 
democracy like Japan with a focus on public debates, contestation of ideas, public accountability, 
transparency, competitive political competition and due legislative processes.
As Osaka City is the biggest municipality in Osaka Prefecture, to proceed with his reform 
plans, Hashimoto needed to overcome/placate local opposition. When a mayoral election was 
scheduled for November 202, and he decided run for reelection. Hashimoto decided to compete 
for the post of Mayor of Osaka City and resigned as the governor of Osaka Prefecture. Ichiro 
Matsui, his political ally, ran for governor. In November 20, Hashimoto and Matsui won the 
mayoral and gubernatorial elections, respectively. In addition to his reform focus, Hashimoto was 
also active in party politics. In 200, Hashimoto gathered like-minded people and established a local 
political party, the IFO. The IFO won a majority of seats in the Osaka Prefectural Assembly in the 
April 20 election. In this strategy to help Osaka regain vitality, there was a desire to foster more 
cooperation between the Osaka City and Osaka Prefecture governments.  
(2) Hashimoto’s Osaka Metropolis Plan
In April 200, Hashimoto proposed the Osaka Metropolis Plan, which can be summarized by 
the following two points 8):
(i)  Dissolving Osaka City and other surrounding cities into five special wards
(ii) Making the relationship between the Osaka Prefectural Government and the governments 
of special wards analogous to that between the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and the 23 
special wards in Tokyo
According to the non-conventional views of Hashimoto, the Osaka Metropolis Plan had two 
major advantages. First, by introducing mayors who would be chosen by election for the special 
wards, communication between the local government and citizens would be improved. Second, by 
clearly allotting tasks between the prefectural government and special ward governments, local 
governance would be more consistent and systematic. Some experts, such as Shin-ichi Ueyama 
and Kaoru Kida, supported Hashimoto’s view 9). In terms of counterarguments, some wondered if 
the Osaka Metropolis Plan may cause incompatibility between special ward governments and the 
Osaka prefectural government. Sometimes, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and the 23 special 
ward governments do not always agree on budget allocation and administrative power/tasks. This 
is natural given the idiosyncratic local issues and needs. Therefore, some special ward governments 
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in Tokyo occasionally propose the conversion of special wards to cities.
To dissolve Osaka City into special wards, Hashimoto had to follow the procedure stipulated 
in the Act Allowing for the Establishment of Special Wards in Non-Metropolitan Areas. The law 
requires citizens’ approval of the Osaka Metropolis Plan through a referendum. To conduct a 
referendum, agreement from the assembly of the Osaka City government is necessary. The 
unconventional move did not meet with agreement from established Osaka City Assembly 
representatives drawn from major national parties such as the Liberal Democratic Party, the 
Democratic Party of Japan, New Komeito, and the Japanese Communist Party. They were united 
firmly against the referendum for good and credible reasons. After time-consuming political 
maneuvering, Hashimoto finally submitted a draft of the Osaka Metropolis Plan for a referendum, 
which was announced on April 27, 205, and took place on May 7, 205. 
Throughout the three-week campaign period for the referendum, Hashimoto repeatedly 
promised that he would retire from the political world if the draft was rejected to show his 
commitment. The referendum resulted in the following: 694,844 (49.6%) votes in favor and 705,585 
(50.4%) votes against. Accepting defeat, Hashimoto decided to retire from politics. When his term as 
Osaka City mayor ended in November 205, he did not run for reelection. Despite his supporters, 
Hashimoto has never again run for any election for public office. While he is still a TV personality, 
he no longer has any official position in political circles.
(3) IFO’s activities after Hashimoto’s retirement
Since its establishment in April 200, the IFO has been the biggest party in the assemblies 
of Osaka’s city and prefectural governments. After Hashimoto left politics, the IFO carried on 
Hashimoto’s approach for reforming Osaka’s governance and revitalizing Osaka’s society. The IFO 
advocates the following three principles. The first regards small government through deregulation 
and privatization. Under the IFO’s initiative, some public businesses, such as the Osaka municipal 
subway, were privatized. The IFO also has presented cutback plans for labor costs in local 
governments.
The second constitutes reattempt to approve the Osaka Metropolis Plan. While the plan was 
rejected in the 205 referendum, the IFO still believes the dissolution of Osaka City into special 
wards is necessary to improve Osaka’s local governance. The IFO also recognizes that there is 
some room for improvement on Hashimoto’s draft. Thus, the IFO is preparing a revised version of 
the Osaka Metropolis Plan to submit to a referendum. The third is related to the promotion of the 
tourism and leisure industry. Kyoto and Nara, Japan’s top two historical cities, are easily accessible 
from Osaka. In addition, Osaka’s Kansai Airport has the largest number of international LCC flights 
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among Japan’s airports. The number of foreign visitors continues to increase, and their spending 
benefits Osaka’s local hotels, shops, and restaurants. 
To help attract more tourism, the IFO has high expectations for a large-scale development plan 
to construct an integrated resort zone on man-made land in Osaka Bay, modeled on Singapore’s 
development projects in the Marina Bay area. To attract foreign tourists to the resort zone, the IFO 
plans to build a casino there. In 206, the Integrated Resort Maintenance Promotion Act, known 
as the IR Act, was passed by the Japanese Diet. It enables the national government to designate 
certain areas as IR Special Zones where casino businesses are allowed. Osaka’s city and prefectural 
governments jointly formed a special commission to create an IR Special Zone in Osaka, and the 
IFO has repeatedly expressed strong support for it. It is expected that the national government’s 
designation for the land in Osaka Bay will come in 202 or 2022.
Those who are less supportive of these business reforms wondered whether investment in 
the tourism and leisure industry would really revitalize Osaka’s economy. They noted that, since 
income from the tourism industry can fluctuate and influenced by many different factors, there 
may be an element of cyclical upturns and downturns affecting Osaka’s economy 0). Conservative 
groups fear that a rush of foreign visitors would touch upon the lifestyles of traditional communities. 
In addition, some groups show concern that casino businesses may open the door to illegality and 
gambling issues. 
7. Concluding remarks
In Japan, many manufacturing-focused cities that flourished during the industrialization 
period are adjusting in the post-industrialization period. Osaka is unique in the sense that non-
mainstream peripheral local politicians, such as Hashimoto and IFO members, initiated reform 
plans. As the plans are still in their early stages, and many challenges will need to be overcome 
before meaningful change can occur, one cannot currently speculate on the reform outcome, 
which is not the main focus/concern of the article. This article is more interested in the process 
through which a non-mainstream politician entered reformation politics and business revitalization 
through the periphery. Considering that many East Asian countries are now in the late stages of 
industrialization, Osaka’s experience could be informative for them. Non-mainstream political 
attempts are also interesting to study.
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Notes
 1) The Local Autonomy Act stipulates various conditions for distinguishing between cities, towns, and 
villages. For example, even if a municipality has a population exceeding 50,000, the municipality is not 
designated a city ( it is designated as a town) if the total number of households in urbanized areas is less 
than 60% of the total number of households in its jurisdiction. For simplicity, however, this article refers 
to the condition pertaining to the total population only.
 2) Osaka is located in the lower section of the Yodo River system. The number of tributaries in the Yodo 
River system is 965, and this system is the largest in Japan.
 3) According to the Report on Prefectural Accounts produced by the Cabinet Office, the average annual 
growth rate of nominal GDP in Osaka for 955-74 is 7.3%, which is higher than that in Tokyo (5.5%) 
and the national average (5.6%) (the original data are downloadable at https://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/
sna/data/data_list/kenmin/files/contents/main_68sna_s30.html).
 4) As explained in Section 2, Tokyo is not a prefecture but a single metropolis. After 983, Aichi Prefecture 
has had the highest per-capita income among the 46 prefectures.
 5) Some accounts of governance here: Sakaiya, Taichi, Shin-ichi Ueyama, and Eiji Hara (202), Osaka 
Ishin towa Nanika ( Initiatives from Osaka), Tokyo: Togensha.
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